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Abstract
This paper presents a new dataset on self-determination movements (SDMs) with
universal coverage for the period from 1945–2012. The dataset corrects the selec-
tion bias that characterizes previous efforts to code SDMs and significantly expands
coverage relative to the extant literature. For a random sample of cases, we add
information on state-movement interactions and several attributes of SDM groups.
The data can be used to study the causes of SDMs, the escalation of SD conflicts
over time, and several other theoretical arguments concerning separatist conflict
that have previously been tested with incomplete or inferior data. We demonstrate
the usefulness of the new dataset by revisiting Barbara Walter’s influential argu-
ment that governments will not accommodate SD challengers if they face several
potential future challengers down the road because they want to build a reputation
for strength. We do not find support for Walter’s reputational theory of separatist
conflict.
∗Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
†Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
‡We thank the editor, the two anonymous reviewers, Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, Brian Philipps,
Jonathan Wheatley, and conference participants at MPSA 2016, APSA 2015, and the 2015 European
Network of Conflict Research (ENCoRe) Meeting in Barcelona, Spain, for their helpful comments. Ger-
mann and Scha¨del gratefully acknowledge funding through grants №135127, №143213, and №162220 by
the Swiss National Science Foundation. We also want to thank Piia Bra¨nfors, Nora Keller, Shelley Liu,
and Rahel Zu¨rrer for valuable research assistance, as well as Seraina Ru¨egger for her help with several
Eastern European cases. Annalisa Zinn contributed significantly to an earlier version of the dataset
presented in this article.
1
1 Introduction
Why do groups make claims for more self-determination? When do such claims lead to
violence? When do states accommodate them? To address these important questions, a
vast literature on ethno-nationalist conflict has drawn insights from both qualitative (e.g.
Hechter 2000, Horowitz 1985) and quantitative data (e.g. Ayres & Saideman 2000, Hale
2000, Jenne, Saideman & Lowe 2007, Roeder 2007, Sambanis & Milanovic 2014). The
approaches are varied: some focus on opportunity structures that favor the organization
of violent challenges to the state (e.g. Cunningham 2013b, Walter 2006b), while others
focus on institutional determinants of separatism (e.g. Beardsley, Cunningham & White
2017, Brancati 2006, Sambanis 2000), or the conditions leading to successful separatist
challenges (e.g. Coggins 2011, Cunningham 2011, Walter 2003, Walter 2006a).
These studies make clear that separatist conflict is a persistent feature of world pol-
itics. Violent separatism spiked after the end of the Cold War; new states were created
in East Timor and South Sudan; de facto independent regions emerged in Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Somalia; and separatist sentiment is fueling conflicts in Eastern Ukraine,
Turkey, Catalonia, and Scotland, among other places. Peripheral demands for increased
autonomy or secession have been a cause of more than a third of all civil wars since 1945
(Sambanis & Milanovic 2014).
To understand these cases, insights must be sought through the analysis of high-
quality large-N data on self-determination movements (SDMs). Quantitative data on
SDMs have been collected globally, identifying the claimants, targets, and dates of sepa-
ratist conflict. The two main sources of data are the Minorities at Risk project (MAR)
(Gurr 1993, Gurr 2000b, Minorities at Risk Project 2009) and the Peace and Conflict re-
ports published biennially by the Center of International Development and Conflict Man-
agement (CIDCM) (e.g. Marshall & Gurr 2003, Marshall & Gurr 2005).1 Many studies
have drawn on these datasets (e.g. Ayres & Saideman 2000, Siroky & Cuffe 2015), and
some have added variables to them (e.g. Cunningham 2014, Kelle 2017, Walter 2006a).2
1The CIDCM data are an offspring of MAR, but include groups that are not in MAR.
2Cunningham (2014), for example, added information on the number of factions within each movement
and Walter (2006a) on whether governments accommodated separatist movements.
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Unfortunately, coverage in both MAR and CIDCM is incomplete. All datasets building
on MAR and CIDCM in the extant literature are biased in favor of including cases of
highly mobilized, violent SDMs in less developed and to some extent less democratic
countries. For many research questions, this skewed data coverage will translate into
biased causal inferences about separatism.
We are not the first to recognize this problem, but the solutions offered to date have
limitations. Sorens (2012, chapter 2) added around two dozen cases to MAR. But as
we show later, MAR misses many more cases than that. Coggins (2011) and Griffiths
(2015) created new datasets with somewhat broader coverage, including colonial cases
that are excluded from MAR. However, they only include cases of secessionist claims and
exclude movements making more limited claims for autonomy. Our dataset reflects an
understanding of self-determination as a variable ranging from minor to major claims.
The intensity of many SDMs changes between autonomism and secessionism depending
on underlying conditions. If we coded exclusively secessionist cases, we would not be able
to explain escalation processes. Our approach reduces the risk of selection effects in the
study of separatist war onset as we include violent secessionist movements that started
out as non-violent claims over more limited forms of autonomy.
Our research leads us to code a total of 464 movements in 120 countries from 1945-
2012. This is more than double the number of SDMs in the MAR and CIDCM datasets.
We distinguish between violent and non-violent claims and, for a randomly drawn sample
of 106 movements, we also code details of government policy responses to SDMs as well
as other variables that allow us to study escalation processes. We provide extensive
documentation, including justifications for all coding decisions.
2 The SDM dataset
The SDM dataset is divided in two parts. The first part identifies SDMs around the
world from 1945–2012, pinpoints the years during which those movements were active,
and distinguishes between violent and non-violent periods of activity. The second part
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provides more detailed information on state-movement interactions over time and includes
information about attributes of claimants for a randomly drawn sample of cases.
2.1 Cross-country data on SDMs, 1945-2012
2.1.1 What is an SDM?
SDMs are movements by one or more political organizations that are connected to an eth-
nic group and make claims for increased self-determination from the state. We elaborate
on elements of this definition below.
Although SD may be exercised in all spheres of social life, we refer strictly to a
group-defined right to self-rule within the boundaries of a territory. SD thus includes
the authority to raise and spend tax revenues; the ability to maintain a defense or police
force; autonomy over policies governing cultural or linguistic practices within a given
territory; indigenous land rights; the power to define the territorial boundaries of the state
within which the group exercises its right to self-determination; and, of course, national
independence. This understanding of SD is therefore close to non-absolute definitions of
sovereignty (see e.g. Krasner 1999).
Based on this broad conceptualization of SD, we code both movements demanding
national independence (such as the Scots in the UK) and movements demanding their
merger with another state (e.g. Serbs in Bosnia), but also movements that merely demand
more internal autonomy (e.g. Mayans in Mexico). That said, we only code autonomy
claims if they exceed a certain level of political significance: they must imply a significant
redefinition of a state’s institutional set-up. Federal states, in particular, are characterized
by constant negotiations over the extent of policy centralization, so we do not code every
claim made by regional governments in federal states. To give an example from the US
context, we do not code claims that abortion or gay rights should be decided at the
state level. By contrast, we code the Yakuts, a group in northeastern Siberia that has
been claiming a radically higher level of autonomy, including greater control over natural
resources in their region, since the early 1990s. We also include Switzerland’s Jurassians,
who pushed for the establishment of a new canton of their own. Both coding decisions
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are consistent with MAR and CIDCM, though they miss many such cases.
SD claims as we understand them must be directed against a state. Thus, we do not
code movements that demand increased policy autonomy from a supranational entity,
such as the BREXIT movement. Also, because our definition of an SD claim entails the
logic of political disintegration, we do not code movements to overthrow a government
or gain increased representation at the center. Because these are aimed at political
integration, we also do not include movements aimed at the merger of nation-states, such
as the pan-African movement or the enosis movement in Cyprus. Finally, we do not
include efforts to preserve the current level of SD (contrary e.g. to Hale 2008, p. 3) as
the movement in the early 1990’s in Moldova opposing unification with Romania.
For a case to be coded, there must be evidence of mobilization; of activity by a political
organization. We must be able to identify a political party, cultural organization, armed
group, or protest movement. The mobilization may take violent or non-violent forms, and
may be both institutional (e.g. running for office) or extra-institutional (e.g. protests).
Separatist sentiment alone is not enough. For example, although nationalist sentiment
was present among Yugoslavia’s Bosniaks long before the 1990s, we only code an SDM
after Bosniak nationalism was expressed with the formation of the Party of Democratic
Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA)) in May 1990.3
The literature on autonomy and secession has focused almost exclusively on claims
made by ethnic groups. We follow this practice, though we have a broader concept
of ethnic identity that is defined not only by the usual descent-based attributes (race,
religion, language), but also region of origin. Thus, several of our ethnic groups are
regionally-defined groups. This conceptualization of ethnicity is consistent with Horowitz
(1985) and allows us to capture more cases. Shared regional identity can be sufficient to
define group differences that underlie autonomy movements, as was the case in the U.S.
civil war. Our approach is consistent with MAR, which states that it includes groups
defined by their “region of residence” (Gurr 2000b, p. 4) and codes a number of claims
by groups that can be considered ethnic only by virtue of their shared regional identity,
3We do not include fringe organizations with very few followers.
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such as the Crimean Russians in Ukraine or the Jurassians in Switzerland.4
Finally, we do not include colonial liberation movements.5 This is not a definitional
requirement—anti-colonial movements constitute SDMs according to our definition—but
a choice made for practical reasons. The experience of anti-colonial movements is less
relevant for contemporary separatism; and finding relevant information is harder for these
cases. Moreover, MAR and CIDCM both exclude anti-colonial movements, as is custom-
ary practice.
2.1.2 Coding the global incidence of SDMs
The conceptualization discussed above leads us to code a total of 464 SDMs between
1945 and 2012. We relied upon a broad range of sources to identify SDMs. Existing
datasets on SD disputes constituted a good starting point for coding, in particular MAR
and CIDCM. We did not, however, take extant coding decisions for granted and dropped
cases included in these datasets if we found no corroborative evidence of separatist mobi-
lization. Examples of groups that were excluded based on this include the Bahais in Iran,
Blacks in Ecuador, and Germans in Romania. Many cases that were missing from MAR
and CIDCM were identified using three encyclopedic sources on separatism (Hewitt &
Cheetham 2000, Minahan 1996, Minahan 2002). In addition, we consulted the World Di-
rectory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (Minority Rights Group International 2015),
Degenhardt (1988), material provided by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Orga-
nization (UNPO), and the UCDP/PRIO database of armed conflicts (Gleditsch, Wal-
lensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand 2002, Themne´r & Wallensteen 2014). Further,
news archives were searched for keywords including self-determination, self-governance,
self-rule, regionalism, separatism, and secessionism (in combination with country names).
Finally, coders consulted a wealth of region- and country-specific academic literature (re-
fer to the online supplement for additional information on sources and case histories).
4The CIDCM data also include regionally defined groups, such as the Cornish, the Trans-Dniester
Slavs, the Jurassians, and the Crimean Russians.
5We define a colony as a dependent territory that is neither politically nor legally integrated with
the metropole. Note that we include movements in overseas territories that are fully integrated with the
metropole, such as Guadeloupe.
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In the dataset, SDMs are identified by the ethnic group on whose behalf they make
claims for increased self-rule and their host state (e.g. Scots-UK). As is standard in the
literature, we code separate SDMs if the same ethnic group organizes for SD in multiple
countries. For example, we code separate SDMs for the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey. We
also code separate SDMs if identities overlap. For example, several of Dagestan’s ethnic
groups have agitated for increased self-determination for themselves, but there has also
been a movement demanding increased self-determination for Dagestan as a whole. Thus,
we code separate SDMs for several Dagestani groups, including the Avars and the Lezgins,
but also an umbrella Dagestani movement. Finally, a movement included in our dataset
may consist of multiple organizations making claims on behalf of the same group, and
the claims of the different organizations may vary in intensity. For example, we code a
single Catalan SDM in Spain even though this movement has both organizations claiming
increased autonomy and organizations claiming national independence.
For all 464 movements, we record the year in which the first organized SD claim
was made (the movement start date). If we find evidence that a movement ceased to
exist or abandoned its demands for increased SD, we code an end to the movement in the
respective year (the end date). A successful secession also ends an SDM, as does a country
break-up that leads to a change in a group’s host state affiliation. For example, we code
an end to the Hungarian movement in Czechoslovakia in 1992 because Czechoslovakia
ceased to exist. If the same group continues to claim self-rule under the new host, this is
counted as a new challenge. For example, the Hungarians in the former Czechoslovakia
continued to claim self-rule in independent Slovakia. Coding the date a movement ends
is not always straightforward. Events that would qualify for movement termination are
not reported systematically and in some cases movement activity stops very gradually.
We therefore applied a “ten years of inactivity rule”, which means that we coded an end
to a movement if we did not find evidence of organized separatist activity for ten years.
While any cutoff rule is arbitrary, we chose a long time horizon so as not to omit non-
violent groups with discontinuous activity, a low public profile due to fear of government
repression, or groups in their early stages. If a movement ends and then restarts, we code
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Table 1: Basic descriptives
SDMs 464
Countries 120
Average years of activity 30.15
Ongoing SDMs (2012) 327
SDMs with discontinuous activity 36
Violent SDMs 150
Average years until first violence 6.55
a second period of activity. For example, we code two phases of activity for the Estonians
in the former USSR, with the first corresponding to the partisan resistance campaign in
the immediate post-WWII phase (ending in 1956) and the second starting in 1987 in
the context of glasnost and perestroika, ending with Estonia’s independence (1991). No
movement in our dataset had more than two phases of activity. Movements which were
ongoing as of 2012, the last year we cover, are denoted as “ongoing.” See Table 1 for a
brief summary.
A first look at the data reveals a number of interesting facts. Figure 1 shows that the
number of SDMs increased steadily and almost linearly until the late 1980s, with a spike
occurring due to the breakdown of the USSR and of ethnofederal states in Eastern Europe
(the number of movements in the former USSR increased from 5 in the early 1980s to as
many as 68 in 1991). Since the early 1990s, the number of SDMs has stabilized and we
even observe a small downward trend in recent years, though the overall number remains
high (our 10-year rule probably contributes to the persistence of SDMs). The average
duration for an SDM is over 30 years, revealing that autonomy concessions are hard-won
or that new claims often escalate even after governments make concessions. More than
70% of all movements we cover are ongoing as of 2012.6
Looking at regional patterns (see Figure 2) the most striking observation is the explo-
sion of separatist movements in the former USSR in the late 1980’s/early 1990’s. Many of
the movements born under the crumbling Soviet regime have continued to operate in the
USSR’s successor states, including (as of 2012) 29 in Russia, 4 in Georgia, 4 in Ukraine, 2
6In addition, about 15% of the cases coded as having “ended” are due to country break-ups, while
the respective groups continued to claim self-rule in a different host state. Compare the example of the
Hungarians in Czechoslovakia/Slovakia mentioned earlier.
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Figure 1: SDMs by calendar years distinguishing between violent and non-violent claims
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in Moldova, and 1 in Azerbaijan. Southern and Eastern Asia is another region with high
separatist activity, in particular India (22 SDMs in 2012, up from 9 at independence),
Myanmar (13 in 2012, up from 7), and Indonesia (6, up from 4).
Separatism has increased in a number of other regions. Western Europe harbored only
15 movements in the 1940s, but more than 50 in 2012. Italy has the highest number (16)
but Spain saw an even more spectacular increase in SDMs, up from a single movement in
the 1940s to 11 in 2012. France also has its share of separatism, though almost half of its
13 movements are in overseas territories, such as Guadeloupe. In the Americas, we code
60 active movements in 2012, up from 6 movements in the late 1940’s. To a large extent,
this increase is due to a wave of mobilization among indigenous groups starting in the
1970’s. Meanwhile, SD activity remains absent from many African and Middle Eastern
countries, though with some notable exceptions (Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, and
Uganda in Africa; Iran and Iraq in the Middle East).
Our data allow us to distinguish between violent and non-violent movements as well
as between spells of low and high-intensity violence. Our coding of high-intensity violent
SDMs follows Sambanis’s (2004) definition of a civil war and identifies periods of high
violence over SD demands based on data from Doyle & Sambanis (2006), as updated in
9
Figure 2: Number of SDMs by countries
Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2015). Our preferred measure of low-intensity separatist
violence is an inclusive category that incorporates any of the definitions of low-level vio-
lence currently in use, drawing data from UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themne´r
& Wallensteen 2014), MAR (Minorities at Risk Project 2009), and the Peace and Con-
flict reports (in particular Marshall & Gurr 2003, Hewitt, Wilkenfeld & Gurr 2008), but
also news reports and case studies.7 Again, interesting patterns emerge. Figure 1 shows
clearly that at any given point in time, violent SDMs are a small share of the total number
of cases. Much of the quantitative literature on separatism has focused on violent move-
ments because they are more destructive and possibly because they are easier to code.
A broader perspective on separatism can emerge from our data by virtue of including
non-violent cases; and the transition from nonviolence to violence can now be studied.
7We have coded a second set of violence indicators based exclusively on UCDP/PRIO data, which
allows for quick robustness checks.
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We note that most violent movements start non-violent. On average, it takes more than 6
years for violence to erupt (see Table 1). Finally, it is noteworthy that violent SD claims
have declined since the early 1990’s, consistent with predictions made by Gurr (2000a)
about the decline of ethnic war.
2.2 Coding conflict dynamics for a random sample of move-
ments
Part two of the SDM dataset includes more detailed information on state-movement
interactions and attributes of SDM groups for a randomly selected subset of SDMs.
New research was required to code many of these variables. Coding state-movement
interactions over time for all 464 SDMs on our list was not practical, so we selected cases
randomly to provide more in-depth data on conflict escalation. We over-sample SDMs
that switched from non-violence to violence (we call these “switched” movements) since
these cases contain more information about escalation than movements that started out
as violent or non-violent cases. The sample consists of 106 SDMs, 59 of which were violent
(we include sampling weights to correct for over-sampling switched movements).8
Our main focus is on how states react to groups making SD claims. We code new
data on several types of government concessions and restrictions: policies by the state
that increase or decrease a group’s level of self-determination, including both autonomy
and national independence, as well as policies that increase or decrease a group’s cultural
rights, such as language or religious rights. While the data on non-violent restrictions
constitutes an original contribution to the literature, there exist other data on government
concessions to SDMs (Cunningham 2014, Walter 2006a). However, this data is only
available for the biased sample of SDMs contained in CIDCM (see below). We provide
broader coverage and, by reviewing a wider set of sources than any previous study, we
identify many previously overlooked government actions and correct other coding errors
in the extant literature. A detailed discussion of our approach to coding government
8We exclude countries with a population of less than 500,000, so 6 movements in 6 micro-states were
dropped before sampling: Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Belize, Vanuatu, Kiribati, and
Micronesia.
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concessions to SDMs is explained in section 5.
For the random sample of cases, we also provide information on a number of other
variables, including:
• Type of SD claim: Do SDMs demand autonomy or secession (national independence
or the merger with a different state)?
• Sovereignty declarations: Do SDM leaders unilaterally declare autonomy or seces-
sion?
• Central state access: Do SDM groups have meaningful representation in the central
state’s executive?
• Regional autonomy: Do SDM groups have a meaningful level of regional autonomy?
• De facto independence: Are SDM groups de facto separated from their host states,
but not de jure?
• Relative group size: What is the population of SDM groups relative to the country’s
total population?
• Spatial concentration: Are SDM groups territorially concentrated?
• Ethnic kin: Do SDM groups have transborder ethnic kin?
• Hydrocarbons: Does the territory claimed by SDMs contain hydrocarbon reserves
(oil or gas)?
• Land border: Does the territory claimed by SDMs contain an international land
border?
• Seashore: Does the territory claimed by SDMs have a sea outlet?
All variables are coded at the group-year level. Sources consulted to code these
variables include the previously mentioned encyclopedic sources (Hewitt & Cheetham
2000, Minahan 1996, Minahan 2002), as well as the World Directory of Minorities and
Indigenous Peoples (Minority Rights Group International 2015). However, in most cases
we also consulted case-specific sources listed in our supplement. Data on hydrocarbon
12
Table 2: Descriptives for random sample variables
Concessions: 303 Sovereignty declarations: 56
Cultural rights concessions 51 Autonomy declarations 18
Autonomy concessions 242 Secession declarations 38
Independence concessions 10 SDMs with at least one declaration (%) 38.64
SDMs with at least one concession (%) 80.07 SDM groups with central state access (%) 44.26
Restrictions: 194 SDM groups with regional autonomy (%) 50.94
Cultural rights restrictions 44 SDM groups with de-facto independence (%) 9.06
Autonomy restrictions 143 SDM groups’ relative share of country population (%) 7.33
Independence restrictions 7 Spatially concentrated SDMs groups (%) 75.23
SDMs with at least one restriction (%) 52.47 SDM groups with transborder ethnic kin (%) 67.6
Type of SD claim: Claimed territory:
SDMs with secession claim (%) 46.2 Contains hydrocarbon reserves (%) 51.45
SDMs with secession claim in first year (%) 31.45 Contains international land border (%) 64.29
Contains seashore (%) 47.19
Note: Absolute figures represent counts whereas all relative figures are aggregated to the group-level
and weighted to account for the oversampling of switched movements. The same group can receive
more than one concession and/or restriction over time.
reserves draws on Lujala, Rød & Thieme (2007), whereas data on group sizes and inclusion
in central government was culled from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Vogt,
Bormann, Ru¨egger, Cederman, Hunziker & Girardin 2015) for all cases where the SDM
group corresponded to an EPR group; for all other cases we conducted original research
with details relegated to our codebook and coding notes.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the random sample. Most SDM groups are
spatially concentrated and relatively small. The average SDM group makes up only
around 7% of its host state’s population. More than half of all SDMs occupy territory that
contains hydrocarbons; and again about half are represented in the central government
for at least part of the time of an active claim. Finally, whereas almost half of all SDMs
claim secession at some point, only a third of them start out as secessionist. Thus, group
claims escalate over time, probably in response to state-group interactions.
Based on our research, we code a large number of concessions (303) and restrictions
(194), mostly over autonomy. Figure 3 shows how long it takes until the state makes the
first concession or restriction after a group makes an SD claim. Clear differences emerge
with respect to country GDP: the higher a country’s income, the more likely an SDM is
to get a concession. A movement’s chances to get a concession after five years of activity
are almost 50% in rich countries, but only 30% in medium-income countries and much
lower in low-income countries. The risk of a restriction is lower overall, but high-income
countries are less likely to restrict group rights. Autocracies are more likely to restrict
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group rights than democracies and less likely to accommodate SD claims. Interestingly,
anocracies are more likely than democracies to make concessions in the first five years
of a challenge; but the pattern reverses and after about 10 years democracies are more
likely to make concessions. At the same time, however, anocracies are also more likely to
restrict group rights—even compared to autocracies. The data suggest that anocracies
have an incoherent institutional commitment to pluralism. Finally, the third panel of
plots shows differences related to violence. Movements that had violently challenged the
state in the past are somewhat less likely to be granted a concession. But prior violence
does not seem to affect the likelihood of the first restriction.9
3 The problem of incomplete case coverage
Next, we consider the issue of incomplete case coverage in existing lists of separatist
movements. We include three such lists: the MAR dataset as well as the 2003 (Marshall
& Gurr 2003) and the 2008 (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld & Gurr 2008) versions of the CIDCM
data (CIDCM stopped publishing data on SDMs in 2008). The former two have been
used widely in academic research (e.g. Ayres & Saideman 2000, Cunningham 2011,
Cunningham 2013a, Siroky & Cuffe 2015, Walter 2006a).10
Simple counts are sufficient to highlight important differences between these datasets
and ours (see Table 3). The SDM dataset has much broader coverage. While MAR iden-
tifies a total of 177 separatist groups in 81 countries, the SDM dataset in the same time
frame (1945–2006) identifies more than double that number of separatist groups (459)
in 118 countries. Moreover, MAR contains many cases (14) that our research suggests
should not be counted (see supplement). The comparison to the other two datasets looks
similar. CIDCM (2008), for instance, list only 175 movements in 82 countries.
What accounts for these differences? We argue that coding error is the main reason,
9The conclusions remain similar when looking at all concessions and restrictions and not only the
first (see supplement).
10We do not include the more recently compiled datasets by Coggins (2011) and Griffiths (2015)
due to their narrower focus on secession claims. We also do not include Sorens’s (2012) extension
of MAR because while Sorens includes autonomist groups, he excludes SDMs that explicitly rule out
independence, which makes cross-dataset comparisons less meaningful.
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier estimates of time until first concession/restriction by regime type,
income, and previous violence
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Note: Weighted estimates. A movement is considered to be located in a democracy if the host state’s
polity2 score is 6 or higher, in an anocracy if the host state’s democracy score ranges between -5 and 5,
and in an autocracy if the country’s polity2 score is -6 or lower. In turn, a movement is considered to be
located in a high-income country if the host state’s GDP per capita is at least 10,000 constant US dollars
(base: 2005 prices), in a medium income country if the GDP per capita is in-between 4,000 and 9,999
constant US dollars, and a low income country if GDP per capita is below 4,000 constant US dollars.
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Table 3: Incomplete coverage in other datasets
MAR CIDCM (03) CIDCM (08) All combined
MAR SDM CIDCM SDM CIDCM SDM Combined SDM
Period 1945–2006 1955–2002 1955–2006 1945–2006
SDMs 177 459 148 450 175 456 237 459
Countries 81 118 78 117 82 118 98 118
Regional distribution:
MENA 20 22 8 19 10 20 20 22
SS Africa 36 73 33 72 34 73 46 73
Central Asia 21 55 19 55 20 55 27 55
SE Asia 34 92 37 91 47 91 52 92
Europe 41 127 34 126 41 127 56 127
North America 9 27 5 26 7 27 11 27
Latin America 12 41 9 39 10 41 18 41
Oceania 4 22 3 22 6 22 7 22
Violent SDMs (%) 57.63 32.24 54.73 30.44 54.86 30.48 52.32 32.24
SDMs in democracies (%) 27.27 39.82 31.97 39.19 39.08 40.09 34.47 39.82
SDMs in high-income countries (%) 10.73 26.8 15.54 27.33 18.86 27.85 15.61 26.8
Note: A movement is considered violent if there was an incidence of low- or high-level violence over SD in at least one year. A movement
is considered to be located in a democracy if the host state’s polity2 score is 6 or higher in 75% or more of all years it was active. In turn,
a movement is considered to be located in a high-income country if the host state’s GDP per capita is at least 10,000 constant US dollars
(base: 2005 prices) in 75% or more of all active years. MENA stands for Middle East and Northern Africa, SS Africa for Sub-Saharan Africa,
and SE Asia for Southern and Eastern Asia. Refer to the supplement for more details on how we compared the different datasets.
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though differences in coding rules also matter. First, there are differences due to the
aggregation of some groups to larger entities. This applies mainly to indigenous groups.
For example, while both MAR and CIDCM code a single Native American movement in
the US, we code 5 separate groups (Cherokee, Dine (Navajo), Iroquois, Lakota (Sioux),
and Pueblos). In addition, the other datasets systematically exclude some groups that
we include. MAR only includes groups with a population of more than 100,000 or more
than 1% of a country’s population; and it only covers countries with a population of more
than 500,000. By contrast, we code small groups, such as the Toubou in Niger, the Sumos
in Nicaragua, the Iroquois in Canada, and the Cherkess in Russia. We also code a total
of 6 movements in micro-states, including the Nevisians in St. Kitts and Nevis. These
cases can be easily dropped to better approximate the coding rules in other datasets.
The starkest definitional difference emerges with the CIDCM data. According to
Quinn & Gurr (2003, p. 26) only territorially concentrated groups are included and
non-violent movements are included only if they are currently active. The same coding
rules apply to the 2008 report. However, while most SDMs have at least a low level
of spatial concentration11), one can find SD claims by groups that are not spatially
concentrated by any coding rule, such as the Turkish Cypriots before the island’s partition
in 1974. Dropping inactive non-violent movements introduces another selection problem
since cases where the government allows movements to fester are then over-represented.
In sum, definitional differences account for minor disparities across datasets. Coding
error is the main source of difference. Critically, our research suggests that measurement
error is non-random. A look at the regional distributions offers a valuable first insight as
to what types of SDMs are missing from the other datasets. While MAR and CIDCM
miss cases across all world regions, the region with the highest number of missed cases is
Europe. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given these regional distributions, we find that MAR and
CIDCM systematically under-represent non-violent movements (see Table 3). MAR and
11We code a group as concentrated if at least half of all group members reside in a contiguous territory
where they make up an absolute majority. According to this rule, around 75% of all SDMs can be
considered spatially concentrated (see above). MAR has a lower threshold, requiring only that at least
one quarter of a group’s population reside in a contiguous area where the group makes up a relative
majority. According to this rule, the share of concentrated SDMs is even higher. The Peace and Conflict
reports do not define what they mean by territorial concentration.
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CIDCM may deliberately omit small non-violent movements, but this is not mentioned
in any coding rule and it is not easy to say a priori which movements should be taken se-
riously. MAR and CIDCM, too, include some weakly mobilized non-violent groups, such
as the Cornish in the UK or the Saamis in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. No dataset
makes use of an explicit rule on the extent of public support for SD a condition for inclu-
sion, so we err on the side of including small groups in most cases (the codebook explains
why we choose not to include some fringe groups). In addition, our research suggests
that MAR and CIDCM systematically omit groups from richer countries and, to a lesser
extent, democracies.12 Such systematic measurement error is likely to bias inferences in
studies of separatism drawing on MAR and CIDCM. To illustrate this point, we used a
standard civil war model to compare the country-level characteristics of the number of
SDMs in a country across datasets (the results are reported in the supplement). We find
that MAR and CIDCM systematically under-estimate the effects of GDP per capita and
democracy, especially in more recent years.13 We also find (smaller) differences regarding
other variables, including whether states are newly independent or non-contiguous. Sim-
ilar biases are likely to emerge for many other research questions (for a general discussion
see e.g. Hug 2013).
4 Uses of the SDM data
The SDM dataset can be used to address several important and unanswered questions
related to separatist mobilization. In particular, any question that involves the onset,
duration, or escalation of separatist conflict can be studied using our data. One of the
key advantages of our data is that they do not suffer from the case selection bias that
is inherent in MAR and CIDCM and they can be used to study conflict escalation. The
analysis of separatist conflict can now start much earlier than the onset of civil war. For
example, the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka had its beginnings in moderate claims for
12However, additional analyses suggest that measurement error in MAR and CIDCM is primarily a
function of whether movements are violent or not. The differences regarding democracy and wealth are
to a large extent a result of the fact that violent movements tend to be in poorer and less democratic
countries (see supplement).
13Coverage differences between MAR/CIDCM and SDM become more pronounced over time.
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federalization long before the conflict escalated to secessionist war in 1983. Using our
data, the sources of conflict escalation can be explored in detail.
For many questions, such as for analyses of the onset of separatist mobilization or
transitions from non-violent to violent mobilization, our data must be supplemented
with additional variables and merged, depending on the researchers’ preferences, with
country-level or group-level data (such as EPR (Vogt et al. 2015) or AMAR (Birnir,
Wilkenfeld, Fearon, Laitin, Gurr, Brancati, Saideman, Pate & Hultquist 2015, Birnir,
Laitin, Wilkenfeld, Waguespack, Hultquist & Gurr forthcoming)). In this respect, it is
important to note that no extant group-level dataset provides information on all SDM
groups. EPR, for example, does not include regionally defined groups. There may also
be aggregation differences. It is important that researchers consider the implications of
dropping SDM groups due to missing data and, if necessary, collect data on missing cases.
While our dataset can be used to study separatist mobilization at the country-level,
disaggregation offers more leverage. Many of the variables of interest are defined at the
group (or regional) level, such as the existence of hydrocarbon reserves in the separatists’
territory. Furthermore, many states have multiple SDMs, so group-based analyses allow
one to trace individual conflicts over time and explore the effects of state-movement
interactions using the data provided in the random sample component of our dataset.
For example, several studies have asked if government concessions on autonomy are likely
to satisfy groups seeking SD or if accommodation will have the opposite effect, fanning
the flames of separatist conflict (e.g. Cederman, Hug, Scha¨del & Wucherpfennig 2015,
Chapman & Roeder 2007). How do autonomy restrictions affect conflict escalation?
These questions could not be addressed fully in the extant literature, but answers are
now within reach with our new data on government concessions and restrictions.
Our data can be used to study several other questions about the dynamics of SD
conflicts. For example, the claims variable can be used to compare the conditions under
which SDMs make more limited claims for autonomy as compared to maximalist claims
for outright secession. The data on concessions and restrictions can be used to study
why states accommodate some groups while ratcheting up restrictions against others,
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a question we explore next by re-analyzing a prominent study of the determinants of
government accommodation of SDMs.
5 Application
Next, we demonstrate the usefulness of our dataset by reconsidering Barbara Walter’s
(2006a) influential argument that government accommodation of SD claims is less likely
to occur in countries with a large number of ethnic groups. Missing cases in Walter’s
data are likely to influence her conclusions, as are errors in the coding of government
accommodation of SDMs. Correcting these data errors, we find that Walter underesti-
mates governments’ willingness to accommodate SDMs. Re-estimating her model using
our data, we find no support for her reputational theory of separatist conflict.
5.1 Walter’s reputation argument
Do governments facing many potential challengers refuse to accommodate SD claims so
as to build a reputation for strength? Drawing on the theory of reputation in bargaining
models, Barbara Walter answers this question affirmatively because a government’s con-
cessions to one group is likely to be seen as signaling weakness, which will invite future
challenges and more demands for concessions. By contrast, refusing to accommodate SD
claims should signal strength, which should discourage future challenges. Thus, Walter
argues that the high costs of future disputes imply that even conciliatory governments
will resist accommodation to deter future challengers.14
This reputation logic leads Walter to make two testable hypotheses. The first and
arguably the main hypothesis is that “[a] government’s decision to accommodate demands
for self-determination will be negatively related to the number of challengers it expects
to face in the future” (p. 314). The second hypothesis is that the higher the economic,
strategic, or psychological value of land occupied by potential challengers, the less likely is
14Walter’s (2006a) argument has antecedents in earlier versions of the ‘ethnic domino theory’ see
Horowitz (1985), Saideman (1998), Gurr (2000b), Hale (2000), Toft (2003) and Walter (2003). For a
recent review and analysis see Forsberg (2013).
20
a government to accommodate any challenges (p. 315). We focus on the first hypothesis
though we also show that Walter’s conclusions with respect to the second hypothesis are
not robust using her own data.
Walter (2006a) tests her predictions using data on separatist movements culled from
the 2003 CIDCM report (Marshall & Gurr 2003). Each movement resents one unit of
observation. The dependent variable is a four-point ordinal variable coding the maxi-
mum level of accommodation of an SDM throughout the period of activity: 0 indicates
no accommodation; 1 some reform but not over territory (e.g. inclusion in central govern-
ment, linguistic or religious rights); 2 territorial autonomy; and 3 independence. Walter’s
main independent variable—the number of potential future challengers—is proxied by
the number of ethnic groups in each country. The premise is that any ethnic group might
at some point make a separatist claim. The value of land of potential future challengers is
proxied via the cumulative economic, strategic, psychological, and human (share of pop-
ulation) value of land that is occupied by all minorities at risk (MARs) in each country.
Walter controls for the economic, strategic, and psychological value of the land currently
occupied by groups challenging the state; the relative capabilities of the contestants (us-
ing proxies such as government military personnel); a country’s level of democracy and
the total duration of the SD challenge in calendar years.
The first column in Table 4 replicates Walter’s main results (corresponding to column
1 in Table 1 in her article). In line with her theory, Walter’s results suggest that the
higher the number of ethnic groups in a country, the lower the chances of accommoda-
tion. Furthermore, two of the measures of the value of land occupied by potential future
challengers (the combined strategic value and the combined proportion of the population)
are also negatively associated with accommodation.
5.2 Data issues
There are two main problems with the data used in Walter’s analysis. First, she draws on
an incomplete list of SDMs based on Marshall & Gurr (2003). As discussed previously,
there are systematic omissions of cases, a problem that is exacerbated due to missing
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Table 4: A first assessment of Walter’s reputation argument
SDM replacements
(1)
Walter
(2)
Standard
(3)
Strict
Reputation model
Number of ethnic groups −0.10∗∗ −0.04 −0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Combined economic value 0.05 −0.04∗ −0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Combined strategic value −0.31∗∗ 0.05 −0.12
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Combined psychological value 0.28 0.17 0.32
(0.24) (0.20) (0.20)
Proportion of population (all groups) −2.03∗∗ −0.97 −1.42∗
(1.03) (0.71) (0.73)
Value of land under dispute
Economic value −0.04 0.10 0.02
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Strategic value 0.05 −0.14 0.05
(0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Length of residence 0.01 0.39 0.17
(0.41) (0.38) (0.37)
History of autonomy −0.39 −0.54∗ −0.65∗∗
(0.30) (0.32) (0.30)
Proportion of population (current group) 1.37 −1.53 0.79
(2.03) (1.59) (1.63)
Relative capabilities
Government military personnel −13.57 33.01 38.35
(28.55) (25.78) (24.42)
Government instability 0.41 0.01 0.13
(0.36) (0.31) (0.31)
Group concentration 0.02 0.31 0.14
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20)
Neighboring ethnic groups −0.14 −0.12 −0.13
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12)
Other controls
Level of democracy 0.11∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Duration of conflict 0.00 0.01 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.13 0.13
N 86 86 86
Note: Ordered probit regressions explaining the maximum level of accommodation ever
granted to an SDM. Model 1 replicates Walter’s (2006) main model. Model 2 replaces
Walter’s accommodation data with data based on the SDM dataset for the 51 cases we have
in common (16 of the 51 cases are dropped due to missing data on other variables). Model
3 does the same, but uses a stricter version of SDM’s accommodation variable. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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data in right-hand-side variables, which leaves Walter with only 86 SDMs in 51 countries,
a small fraction of the total number of 450 movements we have coded in the period
analyzed by Walter (see the supplement). Violent movements are over-represented in
her data and movements in aﬄuent democracies are under-counted. The correlates of
government accommodation of SDMs are likely different in violent vs. non-violent cases
or in democracies vs. dictatorships, so these omissions constitute a likely source of bias.
Second, there are problems in how she codes government accommodation. Walter’s
data severely under-count state policies to accommodate challengers. Take the Nagas and
the Tripuris in India. In both cases, Walter codes no government accommodation of those
groups, yet both were granted their own states, Nagaland and Tripura, in 1963 and 1972,
respectively. The case of the Chechens in Russia is another example. According to Walter
(2006a, p. 313), Russia did not make any concessions to the Chechens. Independence
for Chechnya was not an option that the Russian government would allow, possibly
consistent with the reputation argument (see Toft 2003). However, during much of the
1990’s the Russian government pursued a policy of accommodating autonomy demands
to co-opt ethnic/regional elites and this strategy included Chechnya. In 1992, prior to
the escalation of the conflict, the Yeltsin government adopted the Federal Treaty, which
created an asymmetrical federation in which ethnic republics (including Chechnya) were
granted far-reaching autonomy. In 1997, after the first Chechen war, Yeltsin offered
Chechnya a bilateral power-sharing arrangement in return for Chechnya’s reintegration
into Russia. The offer was rejected, but it cannot be argued that Russia showed no
willingness to accommodate any Chechen demands (George 2009, Ross 2002). Miscoding
countries like Russia and India—two large multi-ethnic countries with many potential
challengers—is likely to bias the results in Walter’s analysis.
Closer scrutiny of Walter’s accommodation data reveals a number of other question-
able codings. For a more systematic comparison, we coded our own measure of accom-
modation drawing on data from the SDM dataset for the period analyzed by Walter
(1956–2002). The variable is coded as in Walter, measuring the maximum level of ac-
commodation ever granted to a movement on a four-point scale (with 0 denoting no
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Figure 4: Comparing the accommodation coding across datasets
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accommodation; 1 cultural rights concessions or central government accommodation; 2
autonomy concessions; and 3 independence). There are 51 cases in common between our
random sample and Walter’s data. For those cases, Figure 4 reveals big coding differences
in the two datasets. While Walter codes “no accommodation” in 59% of cases (see the
first panel), we have identified at least a minimal form of accommodation in all but 4%
of cases (see the second panel). In the overwhelming majority of cases, we have coded an
“autonomy” concession (73%), while the corresponding figure in Walter is just 27%.
Conceptual differences in how “accommodation” is defined likely contribute to these
coding differences (we discuss this below). However, most discrepancies are due to cod-
ing errors in Walter (2006a). Errors similar to those described above with reference to
India and Russia are found in many other cases. Indonesia’s Acehnese and Papuans, for
instance, are coded with “no accommodation” even though Indonesia embarked on ma-
jor decentralization reforms in 1999 that included these groups. The Eritreans are also
coded as having received “no accommodation” despite being granted independence after
Mengistu’s overthrow in 1991. Walter also misses lesser forms of accommodation, as with
the Native Hawaiians for whom in 1978 the Office of Hawaiian Affairs was established, an
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institution with limited self-government capacity in support of native Hawaiian culture.
Some of these discrepancies might be explained by differences in the coding of start dates
for the conflicts. For example, Walter codes “no accommodation” for the Croats in Yu-
goslavia, but she appears to code a narrow period of the conflict in the late 1980’s/early
1990’s before the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. By contrast, we code another period
of SD activity among the Croats in Yugoslavia from 1967 until 1972 in the context of the
Croatian spring. While we agree with Walter that there was no accommodation in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, there were significant concessions in the 1967–1972 period,
including the 1971 constitutional amendment that greatly increased Croatia’s autonomy.
As one might expect, these differences in the coding of accommodation influence the
results. If we replace Walter’s accommodation data with ours for the cases that we have
in common and re-estimate her model without making any other changes, none of the
variables related to the reputation logic remains significant at the 5% level (see column
2 in Table 4).
As mentioned above, coding errors alone are not the only source of coding differences,
which also reflect a different conceptualization of accommodation, with our data reflecting
a more inclusive concept. There are gradations of autonomy solutions and while we
have a relatively broad view of what counts as an autonomy concession, Walter may
have tried to code cases according to a stricter rule. For example, unlike Walter, we
code an autonomy concession in case of the Bretons, given France’s stepwise movements
towards more devolved government (Cole 2006). We believe that such cases of modest
decentralization reforms are consistent with the concept of accommodation. Yet it is true
that Brittany’s level of autonomy remained limited as compared to other cases.
Moreover, although she does not discuss this, Walter may have coded only policies
that were fully implemented. We include also partially implemented concessions as long
as there were meaningful steps toward reform. An example is Mexico’s Mayans, whom we
code as having received an “autonomy” concession due to the 1996 San Andre´s Accord.
Among other things, the Accord promised the Mayans increased autonomy over land,
including control over natural resources. Yet it took Mexico several years to come up
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with enabling legislation and the final version went significantly below what had originally
been promised. Nevertheless, we code accommodation in this case because there was some
improvement with regard to the status quo ex-ante. Such forward steps likely influence
conflict dynamics and might also influence how other groups’ assess their chances in
making SD claims.15 Groups do not know if a concession will be fully implemented but
they often respond to negotiated settlements or initial steps in implementing agreements.
Our approach can capture such cases.
Finally, other coding differences are noted in a small number of cases where the
government’s position indicates it is open to negotiation but is not able to implement
concessions without the agreement of SD groups. This scenario concerns groups that
have attained de facto independence, as in the case of the Turkish Cypriots after 1974.
Whereas Walter codes “no accommodation” in this case, we code an autonomy concession
due to a 1977 agreement to establish a bicommunal federal republic in return for the
reintegration of the northern Turkish part—a significant concession from the perspective
of the Greek Cypriot government, even though the agreement was not implemented due
to the island’s divided sovereignty (Solsten 1991).16
To make sure that the differences between Walter’s and our results are not driven by
conceptual differences in the coding of concessions, we coded a second, stricter version
of the accommodation variable. The strict version is intended to address the possible
conceptual sources of coding differences with Walter. Specifically, the strict version counts
only concessions that were implemented to a very high degree and only codes a concession
on autonomy when there was a major act of devolution (less significant concessions on
self-rule are now coded as “reform”). The third panel in Figure 4 gives the breakdown of
government accommodations according to this stricter coding rule. We now have many
more “reforms” (35%) and considerably fewer “autonomy” concessions (43%). But even
with this stricter coding, we have “no accommodation” in only 16% of cases (compared
15The Sahrawis in Morocco constitute another example. We code an independence concession for
the Saharwis in 1988 because Morocco and POLISARIO agreed to hold an independence referendum.
This referendum was never held. Nevertheless, there were steps toward implementation before Morocco
postponed the referendum in 1991 (which we code as a restriction).
16Chechnya’s rejection of a bilateral power-sharing arrangement constitutes another example (see
above).
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to 59% in Walter). Moreover, coding accommodation this way does not change the
results of the analysis: we again reject Walter’s hypotheses regarding the centrality of
the reputation model as none of the variables in her model retain statistical significance
at the 5% level (see column 3 in Table 4).17
5.3 Reanalysis based on SDM
Thus far we have established that Walter’s results are not robust to substituting her
measure of accommodation for ours for the cases we have in common. Next, we use our
full dataset to estimate a new version of Walter’s model.
While we try to remain as close as possible to Walter’s original approach, both the
model and the data now differ from her original article. Regarding data, the most im-
portant differences are that we cover a longer period (1945–2012), analyze a sample
of randomly drawn cases from the population of SDMs, and that data for the accom-
modation variable now comes from SDM for all cases. There are also changes to the
operationalization of some of the control variables. The strategic value of claimed land is
proxied by whether it contains an international land border or seashore (we choose not to
code ambiguous concepts such as “attack routes”). The economic value of the land under
dispute is proxied by the presence of hydrocarbons, whereas Walter also included other
resources such as coal, salt, and gold. Moreover, we employ slight variations of Walter’s
measures for the strength of claimants (see the supplement for details).
Regarding model specification, the most important difference is that we choose to drop
all measures of the combined value of land under the control of potential challengers. The
main reason is that Walter’s data are confined to groups included in MAR. As argued
by Walter (2006a, p. 318) herself, adding these variables to the model may introduce
endogeneity since the number of minorities at risk in a country is a function of regime
17In the supplement we provide additional evidence that Walter’s main result concerning the number
of ethnic groups is not robust. First, it depends critically on India. India is influential because it
constitutes the most ethnically diverse country in Walter’s sample. Furthermore, almost 10% of the
cases in Walter’s sample are from India, and Walter erroneously codes several Indian cases with “no
accommodation.” If India is dropped from her analysis, the coefficient for the number of ethnic groups is
halved and no longer statistically significant. Second, Walter’s main result regarding the negative effect
of the number of ethnic groups on accommodation loses statistical significance if standard errors are
clustered by country. See the online appendix for more robustness tests.
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behavior. For example, unresponsive government behavior may increase the number of
mobilized or discriminated groups in a country, and thus the number of minorities at
risk would go up. As the number of minorities at risk goes up, so will the value of
the land occupied by minorities at risk. The endogeneity problem is compounded by
MAR’s tendency to over-represent violent, strongly mobilized or discriminated groups,
as demonstrated above for SD groups (though this likely also applies to non-SD groups).18
We also choose not to control for the psychological value of the land that is under
dispute because we do not believe that it can be measured without significant error.
Generally speaking, the more contested a piece of land, the more likely the population
will feel attached to it; and cross-country comparisons of emotional attachment are hard to
make: is the psychological value of Kosovo the same for successive Serbian governments
and does Kosovo mean more or less to Serbs than Belfast does to Irish Republicans?
Walter makes a number of implausible assumptions here, such as that governments are
less attached to territories that have previously enjoyed autonomy. We see no evidence of
this and it is easy to find counter-examples where the government fights hard to keep a
territory it is not supposed to be attached to (such as the Karen territory in Burma, where
Burmese government attachment should be low according to Walter yet a separatist war
has been fought since 1947).
We start our analysis with a cross-sectional regression to compare our results directly
to Walter’s. Each SDM constitutes one observation. Table 5 reports the results of ordinal
probit regressions with standard errors clustered by country. As “switched” movements
were over-sampled, sampling weights are employed. The results unambiguously go against
the reputation model, irrespective of whether we use our preferred measure of government
accommodation (column 1) or the strict version (column 2). The coefficient is positive in
both models and even statistically significant in the strict accommodation model, directly
contradicting Walter’s reputation theory.
Next, we turn to a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) evaluation of the model. In this
case, the dependent variable records the level of accommodation in a given year (again
18The number of groups in the country that is used to test hypothesis 1 is not affected by the endo-
geneity concern, as it is not based on MAR.
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Table 5: Reevaluating the reputation model based on SDM
CS TSCS
(1)
Standard
(2)
Strict
(3)
Standard
(4)
Strict
Reputation model
Number of ethnic groups 0.02 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Value of land under dispute
Oil/gas reserves 0.51∗ 0.35 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.28) (0.08) (0.09)
Strategic value −0.03 0.06 −0.07 −0.06
(0.24) (0.24) (0.07) (0.08)
Proportion of population 0.74 2.71∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.82∗∗
(0.96) (1.09) (0.31) (0.32)
Relative capabilities
Government military personnel 71.89∗ 47.94 31.62∗ 32.69∗∗
(40.49) (33.27) (17.08) (15.39)
Government instability −0.08 0.35 0.33∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.32) (0.32) (0.15) (0.15)
Group concentration 0.19 −0.25 0.07 −0.01
(0.29) (0.31) (0.10) (0.10)
Kin groups −0.11 −0.04 −0.03 0.00
(0.15) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05)
Other controls
Level of democracy 0.00 0.01 0.01∗ 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration of conflict 0.02∗∗ 0.01 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.05
N 101 101 3347 3347
Note: Cross-sectional (models 1 and 2) and time-series cross-sectional (models 3 and 4) weighted
ordered probit regressions explaining the level of accommodation granted to an SDM. Models 2
and 4 use a stricter coding of the accommodation variable. Models 3 and 4 include a counter of the
number of previous instances of accommodation as well as cubic polynomials of the time elapsed
since the last instance of accommodation (not shown). Standard errors clustered at the country
level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
ranging from 0–3) rather than the maximum level of accommodation for the conflict.
Annual time-series variants for all our right-hand-side variables are used except for the
number of ethnic groups, which does not vary over time.19 To avoid simultaneity bias,
government instability and the level of democracy are lagged one year. All other right-
hand-side variables do not need to be lagged because they reflect conditions prevailing
on January 1 of each year.
19We do not include country or group fixed effects because our main independent variable is time-
invariant.
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With TSCS estimation we can explore over-time changes in accommodation. Walter
codes the maximum level of accommodation over the duration of the conflict, which is
problematic since concessions are the outcome of dynamic interactions between states
and SDMs. Regimes can change over the life of a conflict as can movement tactics
and this can shape the state’s willingness to make concessions. Moreover, governments
may accommodate the same movement more than once. TSCS estimation allows us to go
beyond an analysis of the maximum level of accommodation ever granted to a movement.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 report the results of TSCS ordered probit regressions.
To correct for the oversampling of “switched” movements, we again employ sampling
weights. To account for possible time dependence, we include a counter of the number
of previous concessions as well as cubic time polynomials (Carter & Signorino 2010), and
cluster standard errors by country. Again, the results do not support Walter’s hypothesis.
For both our preferred coding of accommodation (column 3) and the strict coding of
accommodation (column 4), the coefficient for the number of ethnic groups is positive
and in the latter case it is even weakly significant. We conducted a large number of
robustness tests. Among other things, we re-estimated all models using binary versions of
our accommodation variables and coded a version where only autonomy and independence
concessions are counted as accommodation; we used alternative measures for the number
of ethnic groups in a country; used the number of first-tier administrative subdivisions
in a country as an alternative proxy for the number of potential future challengers; and
added a number of additional controls to the specification. Our substantive conclusion
remains unchanged (see the supplement for details).
In sum, our reanalysis suggests that Walter’s reputation theory cannot be substanti-
ated. Her results were likely an artifact of data problems. However, our re-analysis does
not constitute an outright rejection of the reputational theory of separatist conflict. Gov-
ernments may still care to set a precedent, but only under a set of conditions that are not
specified in Walter’s theoretical model. We contend that a state’s concern for reputation
is unlikely to be just a function of the number of ethnic groups. Fighting a challenger
can be costly for the state and may decrease its ability to fight a future challenger. Thus,
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when deciding on whether to accommodate or invest in reputation, states should take
into account their own resource constraints as well as the strength of both the current
and potential future challengers (Treisman 2004). Furthermore, some governments may
distinguish between violent and non-violent claims: democracies or federal states, for
example, may feel less threatened by limited, non-violent claims for increased autonomy
and reputational concerns need not arise in such contexts.
Furthermore, reputation is likely to be issue-specific. Economists have long argued
that entry deterrence works only if markets are sufficiently similar (Milgrom & Roberts
1982). And in the context of separatism, states usually play on multiple boards. Several
potentially relevant distinctions emerge. First, assuming that reputation-building works
only if subsequent challenges resemble previous ones, fighting a weak challenger is unlikely
to deter a strong challenger in the future. Thus, governments should only be concerned
with reputation if the current and future challenger(s) they have in mind are similarly
strong. Second, states may make a distinction depending on the administrative status of
separatist territories (Griffiths 2015). Granting a concession to an entity with a relatively
unique status does not necessarily set a precedent for other regions. For example, granting
Puerto Rico (an unincorporated US territory) independence would not necessarily set a
precedent for Alaska, Hawaii, or Texas (all fully incorporated US states). Finally, limited
concessions, say on cultural rights, need not affect the state’s reputation for strength as
far as concessions on autonomy or independence are concerned. Overall, concern with
reputation is likely to be much more context-dependent than Walter assumes.
6 Conclusion
Coding data is not glamorous, but it is important. Several studies in the civil war liter-
ature have found that empirical results with big theoretical and policy implications are
sensitive to small coding changes. This paper improves the coding of self-determination
movements and offers data that are likely to lead to broad revisions in what we think we
know about separatist conflict. We discuss which cases should be counted as examples
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of self-determination movements and explore a richer set of historical and other sources,
finding that existing datasets have under-counted non-violent movements, particularly in
aﬄuent democratic countries. We code a total of 464 SDMs worldwide from 1945–2012,
which significantly expands the set of cases used in all prior studies of separatist conflict.
We also offer new data on patterns of escalation, separating violent from non-violent
phases of SDMs.
We demonstrate the value of the new dataset by replicating Walter’s influential study
of government accommodation of SDMs. We code instances of government concessions
and restrictions that significantly improve the quality of the data analyzed by Walter as
well as other variables that contribute to the study of conflict escalation. Using our new
data, we find no evidence that governments in countries with several potential challengers
are unlikely to accommodate SDMs, thereby challenging Walter’s (2006a) conclusion
regarding the pervasive importance of the logic of reputation in separatist conflict.
The logic of reputation is likely to be context-dependent and cannot be tested with in-
direct static proxies such as the number of ethnic groups. Prior conflict with a particular
group; the group’s strength relative to the state; the strength of potential future chal-
lengers; an entity’s administrative status; the sensitivity of territorial concessions in light
of politically salient cleavages in the country—all these are factors that likely condition
the centrality of reputational considerations in the state’s decision-making calculus.
While our dataset can be expanded with more group-specific information, the range
of substantively important questions that our dataset can help address is already large:
What are the causes of violent escalation of SDMs? Why do some groups demand au-
tonomy rather than independence? Do autonomy concessions help de-escalate violent
SDMs? And finally, why do governments accommodate some groups while repressing
others? The answers to all these questions are still open.
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